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Economic and Political Man 
Hardship and Attitudes in the Czech Republic and Central Europe* 
JIŘÍ VEČERNÍK** 
Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague 
Abstract: The interconnection between economic hardship and political attitudes is 
analyzed in four East-Central European countries. Two explanatory keys to recent 
left-turns – the “relative deprivation” and “entitlements” theses – are examined. Fi-
nancial difficulties and paternalistic expectations are high but differ from country to 
country, this resulting in their various locations on the left-right spectrum. Evaluat-
ing the connections leading from perceived economic insecurity to latent participa-
tion in demonstrations, no compact causality appears which would allow hypotheses 
on the direct consequences of households’ hardships on the latent questioning of the 
regime. A model is used to confirm important country specificities and change over 
time in translating the feeling of insecurity into leftist and authoritarian attitudes. 
Czech Sociological Review, 1995, Vol. 3 (No. 2: 157-177) 
Five years have passed since the turning point in East Central European history. Political 
and economic systems underwent extensive changes toward the Western democratic and 
market model, albeit partially and hesitantly on occasion. Peoples’ attitudes, full of en-
thusiasm and confusion at the beginning, have started to become skeptical and critical 
towards the political and economic regime. Simultaneously, social structures and coali-
tion networks commenced change implicitly, redefining old and creating new alliances 
and patterns of collective behavior. 
The reestablishment of the market economy and pluralist political systems in East 
Central European countries is associated with the dismantling of the social security sys-
tem formerly rooted in the production sphere and supported by revenue financing. Unem-
ployment, new sources of inequality and poverty, the marginalization and exclusion of a 
part of the population could all lead to dissatisfaction with the new regime. This dissatis-
faction in turn can engender support for leftist, authoritarian and populist parties and 
might somewhat radicalize peoples’ opinions, and ultimately threaten the emerging de-
mocracy. 
The way citizens experience ongoing transformations can potentially have pro-
found consequences for social peace, political stability and maintenance of the liberal 
economic order. Many questions arise here. How strongly are people experiencing eco-
nomic hardship? What role do they think the state should play in economic life? What 
kind of political organization and leadership do they support? What are the relationships 
between economic attitudes, the probability of leftist attitudes and latent acceptance of an 
authoritarian regime? 
                                                     
*) This research was supported by the NATO Grant “New poverty, political attitudes and welfare 
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very grateful to Gyorgy Lengyel and Vladimír Rys for important suggestions and especially to 
Petr Matìjù for constructing and interpreting the analytical model of confirmatory factor analysis. 
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Thus far, economic and political research in the Czech Republic has paid little at-
tention to the interconnection between the standard of living and political attitudes. Mac-
roeconomic data are not well counterbalanced by microdata on household economic 
behavior and especially assessments of households’ perceived economic outlook and its 
effect on political behavior. It is for this reason that we address some of those questions 
by using several empirical surveys, according to two comparative dimensions: cross-
national (in four East-Central European countries) and over time (post-1989 changes in 
the Czech Republic). 
1. Crossing the economic/political boundary 
The relationship between economic well-being and political behavior has been studied by 
eminent social scholars. In his famous work, Political Man, S. M. Lipset referred to fre-
quent documentation on “the relation between low capita wealth and the precipitation of 
sufficient discontent to provide the social basis for political extremism” and “the strong 
relationship between lower social position and support of ‘leftist’ politics” [Lipset 1981: 
47-48]. 
E. Fromm demonstrated that in transitory situations and economic crises, everyday 
decision-making is accompanied by a fear resulting from insecurity and a sense of threat, 
this itself a result of economic and moral crisis. This fear may be reduced by surrendering 
any decision-making concerning one’s life to an external authority, be it a person, group 
or organization. Thus a person loses freedom but gains security. Democratic institutions 
are accused of inefficiency and ineptitude and are replaced by the rule of a “strong hand”, 
resulting in totalitarian or authoritarian power relations [Fromm 1965]. 
During the transformation of the communist system, all possible sources of sudden 
dissatisfaction may be created and/or strengthened. The adjustment of established eco-
nomic standards and the introduction of markets cause a decline in the national product, a 
rise in unemployment and a fall in the population’s real incomes. The dissolution of the 
former social security system generates vulnerability to poverty. This is, however, only 
one side of the problem, i.e. the “absolute” source of discontent. 
Simultaneously, “relative” sources also arise, due to the creation of the new or 
strengthening of the old “reference groups”.1 Open borders allow much more extensive 
contact with the rich Western countries, demonstrating for many the gap between “com-
munist” and “capitalist” affluence for the first time. Thanks to the liberalization and mar-
ketization, the old properties can be publicly exhibited. A new, wealthy class is generated 
by restitutions, privatization and the second “primitive accumulation”. 
From the temporal perspective, the fall of real incomes and the loss of social guar-
antees contribute to an absolute or relative starvation. Both the absolute and relative dep-
rivation are an important source of discontent and radicalism, as was already shown by 
Marx.2 All of this alters the scales on which “the ordinary man” measures the standard of 
                                                     
1) Relative deprivation was conceptualized alternatively as the perception that the individual 
and/or his/her group is in a disadvantageous position or the perception that individual achieve-
ments have failed to keep pace with individual and/or his/her group expectations [Gurney, Tierney 
1982]. 
2) “A house may be large or small; as long as surrounding houses are equally small it satisfies all 
social demands for a dwelling. But if a palace arises beside the little house, the little house shrinks 
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living and its transformation. Therefore, the “absolutely” anchored discontent could be 
amplified by “relative deprivation” and vice versa, setting off political shifts towards 
radicalism. 
Survey research on political attitudes in Western democracies traditionally empha-
sizes the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the individual. In the ab-
sence of a profound and rapid structural transformation, historical milestones are 
frequently conceptualized as cohort phenomena and discussed in terms of political gen-
erations (e.g. the “children of the Great Depression” in [Elder 1974] or our ’68 genera-
tion). In discussions, it is assumed that historical events at the macro-level transcend 
individual characteristics and define key aspects of the reality that people face in their 
personal lives. 
Across the East Central European region, there is also a considerable amount of re-
search on economic behaviour and political attitudes. On the one hand, there are analyses 
of public opinion polls documenting shifts as well as reversals in people’s attitudes and 
the political scene [e.g. Rose, Haerpfer 1992; Plasser 1993; Heyns, Jasinska-Kania 1993]. 
On the other, systematic research on the economic situation of households and percep-
tions thereof is emerging [e.g. Beskid et al. 1993; Berger 1994]. There has also been ex-
tensive research – initiated by the World Bank – on the “social costs” of the 
transformation and poverty [Milanovic 1992; Cavalcanti 1993; McAuley 1994; Kakwani 
1994] and paralleled by the Social Costs of Economic Transformation (SOCO) project, 
headed by the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna. 
The process of attitude formation is clearly not a passive one. Individuals are ac-
tively engaged in their long-term biographies and short-term experiences, modifying ex-
ternalities into latent and actual activities. The explanatory power of personal 
characteristics is, however, generally much lower than in Western democracies, this as a 
result of the weaker crystallization of social structure. A synthesis establishing links be-
tween household hardship and individual poverty on the one hand and political attitudes 
and latent controversial behaviour on the other is needed. The recent political changes in 
East-Central Europe emphasize the importance of such a study. 
2. The lessons learnt from recent changes 
Since 1989, important changes have occurred on the East-Central European political 
scene. In Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, leftist parties took power or – at least – began to 
participate in government to a considerable degree. In the Czech Republic, the political 
scene recently saw a marked rise in the social democratic party’s popularity. In Poland, 
the Alliance of the Democratic Left (the former reform-communist Social Democracy 
teamed up with the OPZZ trade unions) increased its vote in the September 1993 elec-
tions from 12% to 20%, becoming the largest party in Parliament. The Hungarian Social-
ist Party (formed in 1989 by those who “destroyed the communist system from within”) 
received 33% of all valid votes and 54% of the parliamentary seats in the May 1994 elec-
tions. 
In Slovakia, the post-communist/authoritarian/populist Movement For Democratic 
Slovakia clearly won the October 1994 elections with 35% of votes, the leftist Common 
                                                                                                                                                 
into a hut (K. Marx, Wage, Labor and Capital, as quoted in [Lipset 1981: 48]). See, however, es-
pecially his theory on absolute and relative “miseration”. 
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Option coming in with 10% and the new Association of Slovak Workers securing an im-
portant place with 7% of the votes. In the Czech Republic, the leading parties ODS (the 
Civic Democratic Party) and ODA (the Civic Democratic Alliance) are experiencing a 
constant decrease in their potential support whereas the CSSD (Czech Social Democracy) 
has doubled its potential support since the mid-1992 elections, with the result that the 
numbers of ODS and CSSD supporters are as close as ever. This signalizes the possibility 
of changing the proportion of seats in the post mid-1996 election Parliament, if not the 
necessity of establishing a Great Coalition government in the here and now. 
Table 1. Left-right political orientation (%) 
 Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia  
 1991 
Extreme left 5.6 4.2 5.1 9.1 
Rather left 17.1 19.2 18.2 18.7 
Middle 38.4 56.9 50.6 40.9 
Rather right 26.3 15.7 17.4 21.4 
Extreme right 12.7 4.0 8.7 9.9 
 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
L/R index* 44.2 51.0 48.4 48.9 
Std dev 26.4 20.5 23.8 26.9 
 
 1995 
Extreme left 3.3 4.5 7.1 6.5   
 5.6 5.3 8.9 7.6 
 9.7 16.5 14.9 14.6 
Middle 35.7 60.9 46.3 44.7 
 19.5 8.5 10.8 13.5 
 16.0 2.4 7.2 6.4 
Extreme right 10.2 1.9 4.8 6.7 
 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
L/R index* 41.6 53.7 52.5 50.6 
Std dev 24.2 17.4 23.3 23.8 
Sources: Dismantling of Social Safety Net 1991;  
Social Consequences of Transition. 
*) The index is calculated such as 0=extreme right and 100=extreme left. 
 
The distribution of left-right political affiliation and its recent shifts is displayed in Table 
1. The rank order of countries is the same in 1991 and 1995, with Hungary the most “left-
ist” (and even more “centrist”) country and the Czech Republic the most “rightist”. Look-
ing at the Left/Right Index, there was a small shift toward the right in the Czech Republic 
whereas other countries turned to the left, Slovakia somewhat less and Hungary and Po-
land at a more rapid pace. The dispersion around the political middle decreased slightly in 
the Czech and Slovak populations while dispersing less in Hungary and remaining the 
same in Poland. 
There are at least two explanatory keys to the left-turn and/or authoritarian tenden-
cies of East-Central European democracies. The first is the “relative deprivation” thesis 
on unfulfilled expectations of improvement in the population’s well-being. The second is 
the “entitlements” thesis that people have not relinquished their reliance upon the state 
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and still welcome a strong redistributive state. In what follows, we will develop these the-
ses consecutively, beginning with the “relative deprivation” thesis. 
According to E. Wnuk-Lipiñski, there is a general shift from value-oriented to in-
terest-oriented perceptions of the transformation. As long as the economic transformation 
was evaluated in terms of values, the majority of the Polish population supported it as 
“right”. However, once implementation of the reform began to touch the standard of liv-
ing of important categories of the populace (especially qualified workers in large state 
enterprises and private farmers), the social base of economic reforms eroded and, finally, 
the radical reform strategy was rejected, despite enjoying partial success [Wnuk-Lipiñski 
1995]. 
According to P. Matìjù, in all countries except the Czech Republic, the downward 
social and income mobility has not been counterbalanced by an upward mobility, thus 
making those countries vulnerable to the left-turn: “other things being equal, the higher 
the number of people who feel like ‘losers’ in a given country, the higher is the risk of a 
left-turn” [Matìjù 1995: 22]. A similar approach and reasoning is to be found in [Øehák-
ová, Vlachová 1995]. 
Using the comparative data, the Czech Republic actually scores highest in terms of 
the population’s satisfaction with the recent developments. Despite the fact that accep-
tance of the market economy is decreasing, satisfaction with the developing democracy is 
increasing. This is the only country among the Visegrád Four where levels of satisfaction 
with the market economy, human rights, democracy and the overall direction of the coun-
try are converging, reaching similar levels in 1994. Whereas commitment to the free mar-
ket is also high in Poland, the gap between the evaluation of the development of the 
economy, on the one hand, and democracy, on the other, is greater. In contrast to these 
two countries, both the satisfaction with democratic development and country direction 
are perceived as having been on the decrease in Hungary and Slovakia over the last sev-
eral years, this according to the CEE Barometer. 
The most apparent synthesis of inter-country differences in attitudes might be the 
evaluation of the present regime in comparison with the pre-1989 system, as revealed 
most recently by the SOCO comparative survey 1995. Whereas the present regime is bet-
ter for 57% of Czechs, only 43% of Poles, 32% of Slovaks and a mere 25% of Hungari-
ans evaluate the new regime as better than the previous one. Following this indicator, the 
level of today’s financial troubles in fact differs considerably more than any leftist or au-
thoritarian preferences. 
There are indeed many positive features of the recent development in the Czech 
Republic: the unemployment rate is currently around 3%; income inequality has increased 
but is still the lowest in the region; the “official poverty” rate is lower than in “social” 
West European countries; and households seem very active in both the formal and infor-
mal economy. Nevertheless, there are also many social problems and sources of various 
dissatisfactions: perceived (subjective) poverty is rising and most households are experi-
encing financial problems. Liberal markets are finding less acceptance and a social-
market solution is increasingly preferred [Veèerník 1995]. 
In the cross-country comparison of the past five years alone, the Czech population 
could be considered the winner of the reform process. This is not valid to such a degree 
within the country (where a considerable portion of people perceived themselves to be 
losers) and may not necessarily be valid in the future (less Czechs expect an advancement 
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on the income ladder than Poles and Slovaks). Nevertheless, whatever changes we regis-
ter in the past period, the comparative advantage of the stronger market commitment from 
the Czech populace when compared with other nations continues, simultaneously sup-
porting “rightist” political attitudes and, thus, the relative stability of the regime. 
3. Financial hardship and expectations of the state 
The communist society seemed extremely equalized in terms of wages, income and the 
consumer market. Furthermore, people were drilled and indoctrinated in the ideology of 
equality, such that higher incomes and wealth were always considered to be unfairly won. 
In line with its ideological and pragmatical functions, the communist state protected peo-
ple in their jobs and provided them with a minimum security in exchange for loyalty and 
formal support. The generally low living-standard was more or less acceptable because 
most of the populace was affected and individual poverty was not necessarily reflected as 
such in the widespread shortage. 
The current economic reform and societal changes had a sudden impact on both the 
objective and subjective, absolute and relative standards. The decreasing consumption of 
large parts of the population is being met with rising claims and expectations. Financial 
difficulties are also experienced as more considerable when compared with higher expec-
tations. In other words, the utility of the same amount of money (in absolute terms) is de-
creasing in a period of rising expectations (in relative terms), now that Austria and 
Germany are becoming the reference for the living-standard of such countries. 
In absolute terms, when people estimate their financial comfort or difficulties, the 
bottom line of great difficulty comprises 5% of households in the Czech Republic, 24% 
in Hungary, 27% in Poland and 10% in Slovakia as a vulnerable population. When com-
paring the 1980s retrospective with the current situation, the percentages vary as multi-
ples of those retrospective evaluations, while the ordering of countries remained the 
same. The only exception is Slovakia, where the situation in 1988 was considered better 
than in the Czech Republic but is currently much worse in people’s minds. 
In relative terms, nearly a half of the Hungarian, Polish and Slovak populations ex-
perienced a deterioration in their relative income position within society, while slightly 
over one tenth experienced an improvement. In contrast, only 30% of the Czech popula-
tion declared downward income mobility and 18% upward mobility. Predictions of the 
change in income position within the next three years are somewhat less gloomy than the 
evaluation of the past, despite the fact that disparities between countries have attenuated 
only slightly. 
We are comparing national gaps between the actual and desired income, as con-
tained in the question “What would be the monthly sum sufficient to allow a decent way 
of life for your household?” (Table 2). Regarding total household income, the gap be-
tween actual and desired income is the largest in Poland, in both absolute and relative 
terms. Regarding income adjusted per capita, the absolute gap is the largest in Slovakia 
and, in relative terms, is about 58% in the three countries except the Czech Republic. It 
seems that a sort of “Czechoslovak need standard” continues to operate in both countries 
in per capita income terms while the actual income levels diverge. 
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Table 2. Actual and desired “decent” income in 1995 (in USD) 
 Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia  
Total household income 
 
the official ER 
actual 324 290 272 254 
desired 496 524 552 440 
difference -172 -234 -280 -196 
 
adjusted to PPP 
actual 762 508 615 754 
desired 1167 920 1246 1308 
difference -405 -412 -631 -554 
difference in % 65 55 49 58 
 
Per capita household income  
 
the official ER 
actual 123 112 94 83 
desired 186 194 172 142 
difference -63 -82 -78 -59 
 
adjusted to PPP 
actual 289 197 222 247 
desired 439 341 390 424 
difference -150 -144 -168 -177 
difference in % 66 58 57 58 
Source: Social Consequences of Transition. 
ER = official exchange rate 
PPP = purchasing power parity (recalculation according to [Havlik 1994]). 
 
Simplifying the problem, financial hardship could be solved in two ways: either by mobi-
lizing personal labor efforts and alternative resources of households or by making the 
state responsible and demanding its engagement in providing the minimum standard of 
living for households. Between the “pure” liberal and “pure” paternalistic solutions, there 
is an endless variety of forms and combinations, real life being more diverse than any 
conceivable model. Nevertheless, there is a considerable reliance on state protection 
within post-communist nations, be that a legacy of state control forcefully implemented 
by the previous regime or the conviction of helplessness in sudden hardship. 
According to J. Sachs, the living standards of the Central-Eastern European popu-
lations did not really drop nor did the people want to use the left-wing parties as instru-
ments to undo the new market economy. “Rather than seeing the Eastern European 
elections as great referenda on the market system, or on capitalism versus communism, or 
even as protest votes against harsh reforms, one can see that the elections (…) have be-
come exactly like elections in Western Europe and the United States: dominated by inter-
est-group politics. Left-wing parties are winning the elections (…) because they are seen 
by the organized recipients of state largesse as the parties most likely to maintain or in-
crease the entitlements of the social welfare state” [Sachs 1995: 1-2].3 
                                                     
3) This view was vehemently challenged by two Polish economists who state that “…the frequent 
elections and negative campaigns, the derailment of the economic policy, and the absence of right-
wing parties from the Parliament since 1993, all have their immediate origin in the unduly cruel 
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Table 3. The state’s responsibilities in various fields 
 Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia  
Health care 87.4 85.5 84.9 90.0 
Child care (under 6) 67.4 69.1 66.4 70.3 
Primary education 90.3 83.5 92.4 89.6 
Secondary education 70.2 80.5 82.1 74.7 
Higher education 57.9 78.5 70.5 63.3 
Costs of children 58.9 69.4 54.2 62.3 
Decent pensions 88.2 91.4 90.7 92.7 
First home for the young 69.5 81.6 68.7 77.0 
Availability of jobs 73.8 88.0 85.2 85.4 
Living conditions for disabled 92.9 86.0 92.5 91.9 
Source: Social Consequences of Transition. 
*) The opinions are measured by an index which runs from 0 (no responsibility) to 
 100 (full responsibility). 
 
Within the generally high level of expectations from the state, there are considerable dif-
ferences among Central-East European countries. This was already observed in the sur-
vey “Social Justice” and the ISSP module “Social Inequality” of the early 1990s, and is to 
be observed again in 1995 in the SOCO survey, “Social Consequences of Transition”. 
According to the score of “core” securities (jobs, housing, costs of children and pen-
sions), the lowest level of expectations is declared by the Czech population whilst the 
highest level of paternalistic expectations seems to be located in Hungary (Table 3).4 
Although commitment to liberal values is still highest in the Czech Republic, we 
can also observe a regressive movement “back” to state paternalism. In the period directly 
after 1989, the new commitment to liberal values was simply added to continuing expec-
tations of state engagement in the economy, job security, price controls, etc. Such am-
biguous attitudes during the initial phases of the transformation are dissolving and being 
replaced by the not so widespread but more consistent opinions tending either to free 
market play or to state guarantees. The main tendency is, however, increasing anticipation 
of state protection of jobs, rents and prices. 
A rising portion of the Czech population is also attracted by the “social-market” 
model or even the previous socialist model. In the pre-election and election period of the 
first half of 1992, the “third ways” were rejected by most of the Czech population, lead-
ing to the victory of the more liberal parties. Beginning in early 1993, however, the so-
cial-market system appeared to be the most desirable solution, unlike the previous period, 
                                                                                                                                                 
reforms… It was not careless social policy that led to the expenditures explosion. Instead, it was 
the unforeseen consequences of the overall economic policy and, in particular, of the stabilization 
program sponsored by the IMF and vigorously recommended by Professor Sachs.” [Kabaj, 
Kowalik 1995: 7]. 
4) In Western Europe, there is a generally high expectation that the state will provide a decent 
standard of living for the old (above 90%), a somewhat lower requirement of decent housing for 
those who cannot afford it (around 80%) and an even lower requirement that the state should pro-
vide a job for everyone who wants one (60-70%), according to the ISSP surveys “Role of Gov-
ernment – 1990” [Bean, Papadakis 1995]. There are certain differences between more liberal and 
more social countries, the Scandinavian populations almost reaching the same high levels of ex-
pectations in East-Central Europe. 
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when the majority of the population voted for Václav Klaus’ “market without adjectives” 
model.5 
Although fewer people agree with state control of the economy, the percentage of 
respondents accepting complete freedom for private ventures and foreign firms is on a 
constant decrease while endorsement of new properties is generally low. After a short 
period of enthusiasm for the widening range of earnings distribution, most people are be-
coming suspicious of larger inequalities. The percentage of people who believe that dif-
ferences in salaries should be larger is decreasing, fewer people hold that poverty is the 
responsibility of the individual, and more people consider that wealth is mostly acquired 
by unfair practices. 
Such a continuous change in attitudes is partly legitimized by direct experience, 
which provides numerous piteous examples. There could be several other explanations. 
First: while liberal attitudes were a fashionable deviation at the beginning of the trans-
formation, people are now looking for easy solutions. Second: the last years have been a 
lesson in restraint, with the fears of a further rise in living costs generating demands for 
increased state protection. Third: the pendulum of history has reached the extreme right 
and is returning to the left. Fourth: Czechs are traditional levellers and social democrats 
and have resisted extreme disparities since the loss of their gentry after the Battle on the 
White Mountain in 1620. 
Although the Czech populace is somewhat particular, it is not so distanced from its 
Eastern neighbors regarding high and increasing expectations of state protection. In all 
countries, budgetary constraints are such that nobody can meet these requirements. This 
means that the objective and necessary gap between expectation and reality could be used 
for political goals. It implicitly involves centralist, etatist and/or authoritarian tendencies 
and could be used for the rise of leftist parties and fuel political radicalism. 
                                                     
5) The popular perception of the social market model is far from the original concept of W. 
Eucken, A. Müller-Armack and “Kreis Ordo”, in which the state was supposed to be a guarantor 
of the market economic order. The popular perception is much closer to a “third way”, where the 
state provides substantial social guarantees and redistributes incomes. It obviously reflects the 
existing German and Austrian model which includes large welfare provisions [Barry 1993]. 
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4. Questioning the democratic system 
When studying and evaluating households’ financial hardship on the one hand and their 
expectations from the state on the other, one important question arises: namely, the rela-
tionships between perceptions of the economic situation, political attitudes and necessitat-
ing or allowing a change in the political system. The argument could be developed as 
follows: 
Diagram 1. The “circuit model” of the relationship between financial hardship and 







Illegitimacy of wealth 
Personal responsibility for poverty 
Questioning of the system 
↑ 
↓ 
More power to the state 





Defiance of the system 
Acceptance of violent forms 
 
A. Due to unemployment, frozen or decreasing real incomes and inflation, households are 
coming up against financial difficulties. They express these difficulties in terms of feel-
ings of hardship, subjective poverty, insecurity and a gloomy economic outlook. 
B. Due to both the objective situation and subjective feelings, the economic reforms and 
political regime could be blamed: poverty is not the individual’s responsibility but 
mostly the state’s concern, new wealth is illegitimate, the socio-political system is un-
fair and should be transformed. 
C. The necessity for change is manifested in the demand that the state play a greater role 
and reassert its responsibilities, limit the free play of market forces and democratic dis-
cussion. A strong leader would be welcomed. 
D. Due to such needs, people are attracted by the leftist parties and acknowledge the pos-
sibility of civil disobedience and, as the case may be, also less peaceful ways of voicing 
discontent. 
In fact, this argument could proceed from any one of the abovementioned points: 
Starting with the “ideological” point of view (B), individual sensitivity to sudden 
hardship is biased by personal ideological perspectives. If economic and social inequali-
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ties are considered as unfair from the outset, one’s own situation is likely to be perceived 
as undeserved poverty, other things remaining equal. 
With memories of the communist past and sympathies to a rather strong state as the 
point of departure (C), the evaluation of one’s current financial situation could be nega-
tively biased, with the state and market failures being far more painfully experienced. 
With political orientation or party’s affiliations (D) as the point of departure – not 
chosen freely but originally determined by family background, community or important 
others – all ideological perspectives, expectations of the state and ways of voicing discon-
tent can be pre-formed or deformed by this fact. 
Instead of a causal relationship, we are dealing with a circuit where dependent and 
independent variables are to be distinguished simply by selecting this or that hypothesis. 
We could therefore feed (with data) and develop (by analyses) all levels and components 
of the model and consider all possible feedbacks without ever finding a “true” cause. 
Here, for various reasons, we should adopt a skeptical stance towards survey data: 
they are exclusively individual, not revealing collective attitudes and goals. They are of-
ten biased by the imputations of the researchers’ hypotheses in survey questions. Further, 
they can hardly expose historical roots and cultural norms which actually and simultane-
ously form attitudes as well as behaviour. This is rather the task of historians analyzing 
the present as a continuation and reflection of individual countries’ past, this when ob-
serving social-democratic tendencies in the Czech Republic, populist tendencies in Hun-
gary, authoritarian tendencies in Poland and nationalist tendencies in Slovakia – or rather, 
differently accentuated mixtures of all tendencies in all countries under observation. 
We document part of this reasoning on two datasets: the first is a four-country 
dataset based on the survey “The Dismantling of the Safety Net and its Political Conse-
quences” which has enabled us to make a cross-national comparison. The second is a 
two-country dataset based on the November 1994 survey “Economic Expectations and 
Attitudes” which has enabled us to make a comparison overtime. Given the complex limi-
tations of matter and method, we will be much more restrictive in our analytical model 
than in its theoretical counterpart. By a confirmatory factor analysis, we have modelled 
the most important relationships in the interplay between economic insecurity and politi-
cal attitudes. 
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Diagram 2. Crystallization of political attitudes in East-Central Europe 





















Three latent variables represent the core of our empirical exercise in cross-national and 
comparison overtime: 
a) The latent variable THREAT is measured by two observed variables: subjective feel-
ings of poverty (FEELPOOR) and feelings of insecurity (FEELINSEC). 
b) The latent variable LEFT is measured by four observed variables: the belief that the 
poor are not responsible for their situation (UNFAIRPOOR), the belief that people get 
rich mostly by unfair means (UNFAIRWLTH), one’s position on the left-right political 
spectrum (LEFTOR) and the opinion that the state should provide jobs (STATE). 
c) The latent variable LEADER is a simple measurement model consisting of only one 
observed variable LEADER expressing preference for the rule of a “strong hand”. 
The analysis focuses on relationships between latent variables (parameters φ12, φ13, φ23) 
that are assumed to differ between countries and/or to strengthen over time. The model 
also makes an explicit assumption that there may be two specific associations of theoreti-
cal relevancy. First, we assume that preferences for an authoritarian leader can be based 
specifically on feelings of insecurity and not associated with left-wing political orienta-
tion (Θδ27) and can be interpreted as right-wing authoritarianism. Second, there may be a 
tendency (especially for some groups) to interpret the leftist orientation as a left-type au-
thoritarian regime (Θδ57). Consequently, the meaning of the LEFT variable as located in 
the model is nearing the social democratic orientation common in Western democracies. 
Concerning the differences between countries (Table 4), the measurement models 
show a high degree of similarity, while the relevant associations confirm cross-national 
differences. The relationships between feelings of economic threat and political attitudes 
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were already strong in 1991, especially the link between threat and leftist orientation. Si-
multaneously, the following country specificities are observable: 
a) The Czech Republic shows the most consistent structure of relationships, characterized 
by the strongest association between economic insecurity and leftist orientation on the 
one hand (φ12) and authoritarian inclination on the other (φ13). At the same time, neither 
feelings of insecurity nor left-wing political orientation produced any specific response 
in authoritarian tendencies. The same is valid for the association between strong leader-
ship and mass discontent (variable RIOTS, not included in the analysis) which indicates 
that approval of mass discontent is of a much more passive nature, to be understood 
more in terms of fears rather than personal anticipation or latent participation. 
b) Hungary also showed a quite consistent structure of economic/political attitudes which 
is not far from the Czech pattern with, however, two specific features: whereas the feel-
ings of insecurity feature less in leftist attitudes (φ12), leftist attitudes engender a more 
authoritarian inclination (φ23). Generally, however, in this country all associations are 
strong, including that between leadership and mass discontent, this indicating a more 
active potential in the feelings of insecurity. 
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Table 4. Crystallization of political attitudes in four East-European countries in 
1991 
Unstandardized LISREL parameters of the model in Diagram 2. 
 Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia 
Parameter and label N = 1100 N = 1500 N = 1500 N = 817 
A. Factor loadings (unconstrained elements of Λx)  
λ11 (FEELPOOR) 0.57 0.84 1.18 0.53 
λ21@ (FEELINSEC) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
λ42 (UNFAIRPOOR) 0.87 0.46 1.12 0.93 
λ32 (UNFAIRWLTH) 0.89 1.14 1.52 1.16 
λ52 (LEFTOR) 0.80 0.64 0.78 0.83 
λ62@ (STATE) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
λ73@ (LEADER) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
B. Errors of measurement (diagonal elements of Θδ) 
Θδ11 (FEELPOOR) 0.83 0.77 0.70 0.87 
Θδ22 (FEELINSEC) 0.48 0.67 0.79 0.53 
Θδ33 (UNFAIRPOOR) 0.83 0.96 0.84 0.89 
Θδ44 (UNFAIRWLTH) 0.82 0.76 0.71 0.82 
Θδ55 (LEFTOR) 0.86 0.92 0.92 0.91 
Θδ66 (STATE) 0.78 0.82 0.87 0.87 
Θδ77@ (LEADER) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
C. Correlations between errors of measurement (off-diagonal elements of Θδ) 
Θδ27   (FEELINSEC x LEADER) -0.07 0.03 0.14*** -0.08 
Θδ57  (LEFTOR x LEADER) -0.05 0.00 0.05* -0.06 
 
D. Variances and covariances of latent variables (elements of Φ) 
φ11 (THREAT) 0.52 0.33 0.21 0.47 
φ22 (LEFT) 0.22 0.18 0.13 0.13 
φ33 (LEADER) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
φ12  (THREAT x LEFT) 0.31*** 0.23*** 0.17*** 0.20*** 
φ13   (THREAT x LEADER) 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.08*** 0.28*** 
φ23   (LEFT x LEADER) 0.13*** 0.22*** 0.07*** 0.15*** 
 
E. Model fit statistics 
χ2/df  53.3/10 24.1/10 19.2/10 15.6/10 
AGFI  0.96 0.99 0.99 0.98 
RMRl  0.035 0.020 0.019 0.022 
@ Fixed parameter 
Statistical significance:  *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05  
 (not reported for factor loadings, errors of measurement, and variances of 
 latent variables that are all significant at the level <0.001) 
 
c) Poland, on the other hand, showed the weakest associations between feelings of insecu-
rity, leftist attitudes and authoritarian inclination. This also indicates the low predict-
ability of the political landscape in 1991. The demand for a strong leader scores the 
highest among the countries under observation and appears rather as an objective in it-
self. Thus, it manifests associations neither with feelings of insecurity, nor with the left-
right axis. Given that the Polish populace declares itself the most inclined to mass pro-
test, its profile appears just as indistinct as that of other opinions. 
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d) Slovakia, still part of Czechoslovakia in 1991, already displayed a slightly different 
pattern to its “older brother”. Though the feelings of insecurity revealed a markedly 
weaker association with leftist attitudes, its association with authoritarian inclination 
was already stronger. Furthermore, the (excluded) correlation of authoritarianism and 
allowing mass discontent (RIOTS) was strongest in the pre-split Slovakia. 
Table 5. Crystallization of political attitudes in Czech Republic and Slovakia in 
1991 and 1994. 
Unstandardized LISREL parameters of the model in Diagram 2. 
 Czech Republic Slovakia 
 1991 1994 1991 1994 
Parameter and label N = 1100 N = 1300 N = 817 N = 812 
A. Factor loadings (unconstrained elements of Λx)  
λ11 (FEELPOOR) 0.57 0.70 0.53 0.97 
λ 21@ (FEELINSEC) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
λ 42 (UNFAIRPOOR) 0.87 0.95 0.93 0.98 
λ 32 (UNFAIRWLTH) 0.89 0.93 1.16 0.74 
λ 52 (LEFTOR) 0.80 0.98 0.83 0.56 
λ 62@ (STATE) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
λ 73@ (LEADER) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
B. Errors of measurement (diagonal elements of  Θδ ) 
Θδ11 (FEELPOOR) 0.83 0.69 0.87 0.76 
Θδ22 (FEELINSEC) 0.48 0.37 0.53 0.75 
Θδ33 (UNFAIRPOOR) 0.83 0.71 0.89 0.72 
Θδ44 (UNFAIRWLTH) 0.82 0.73 0.82 0.84 
Θδ55 (LEFTOR) 0.86 0.69 0.91 0.91 
Θδ66 (STATE) 0.78 0.68 0.87 0.70 
Θδ77@ (LEADER) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
C. Correlations between errors of measurement (off-diagonal elements of Θδ ) 
Θδ27   (FEELINSEC x LEADER) -0.07 0.04 -0.08 0.01 
Θδ57  (LEFTOR x LEADER) -0.05 0.01 -0.06 0.11*** 
 
D. Variances and covariances of latent variables (elements of Φ) 
φ11 (THREAT) 0.52 0.63 0.47 0.25 
φ 22 (LEFT) 0.22 0.32 0.13 0.30 
φ 33 (LEADER) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
φ 12  (THREAT x LEFT) 0.31*** 0.39*** 0.20*** 0.26*** 
φ 13   (THREAT x LEADER) 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.28*** 0.04*** 
φ 23   (LEFT x LEADER) 0.13*** 0.28*** 0.15*** 0.18 
 
E. Model fit statistics 
χ2/df  53.3/10 51.9/10 15.6/10 25.8/10 
AGFI  0.96 0.99 0.98 0.99 
RMRl  0.035 0.027 0.022 0.028 
@ Fixed parameter 
Statistical significance:  *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05  
 (not reported for factor loadings, errors of measurement, and variances of 
 latent variables that are all significant at the level <0.001) 
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There are considerable differences in attitudes between the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. There are more intensive feelings of insecurity and poverty, a stronger reliance 
upon the state and a greater demand for a “true” leader in Slovakia. While in the Czech 
Republic, the call for a strong leader is decreasing sharply, Slovakia remains on a con-
stantly high level.6 Concerning the overtime trajectories in the Czech Republic and Slo-
vakia (Table 5), the results suggest that only one tendency was common to both countries, 
namely an increase in the association between feelings of insecurity and leftist prefer-
ences (φ12). Other changes were nation-specific. 
In the Czech Republic we are witnessing an increasing coherence between the 
threat, leftist orientation and authoritarian inclination which supports the crystallization 
thesis, i.e. that the links between individual opinions are becoming more pronounced, 
thus testifying to people’s deeper insight into the socio-economic-political field. In the 
crystallization process, the specific association between feelings of economic insecurity 
and acceptance of a strong leader weakens, thus suggesting that the economic threat leads 
to leftist attitudes of a social democratic vein, not including authoritarian options. Inde-
pendently of feeling poor, however, the political left is increasingly associated with wel-
coming a strong leader. 
In Slovakia, where – similarly to the Czech Republic – the feelings of economic in-
security are strengthening the leftist inclination, the association between economic hard-
ship and the preference for a strong leader almost disappeared between 1991 and 1994. In 
its place, however, the direct association between an explicit affiliation of the left (Θδ57) 
and the option for a strong leader dramatically increased. Thus, unlike the Czech Repub-
lic, those experiencing economic hardship have lost their earlier illusions that a strong 
leader could solve the problem. Generally, Slovak society is moving towards more au-
thoritarian preferences and lesser readability of attitudes and, consequently, diminished 
predictability of the political scene. 
In our analytical model, we have left out the attitude declaring acceptance of dem-
onstrations and strikes (RIOTS). Although the level of this acceptance is not negligible 
and is, to some degree, interconnected with the other attitudes, its inclusion with “stan-
dard” political attitudes seems rather problematic. First, its links to other attitudes are 
much weaker than the links between other opinions; second, its location within the popu-
lation’s categories is weaker and less determined by respondents’ characteristics than any 
other; and third, only a very small extreme group’s expression of this attitude is congru-
ent with its political vocabulary. 
Given that we are treating this opinion as the most adverse to the standard proce-
dures of parliamentary democracy within all attitudes we survey, there is only a minimal 
threat to democracy “from below”, and this especially in the Czech Republic. Evaluating 
the links leading from perceived economic insecurity to latent participation in demonstra-
tions against the regime, no compact interconnections appear which would invite hy-
potheses concerning the direct relation of individual hardship to an active questioning of 
the regime. 
                                                     
6) In December 1991, 30% of Czech and 33% of Slovak respondents answered “certainly yes” to 
the question that a “strong hand” would be welcomed. In December 1994, the percentage was 
15% in the Czech Republic and 30% in Slovakia – according to Economic Expectations and Atti-
tudes surveys. 
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5. Discussion and conclusion 
Dismantling communism brings about a situation completely without precedent, in which 
all variables tend to be unknown. Actors in the changes are newly defined (or define 
themselves), as are their fields of interest and proposed aims. After being imperceptibly 
interlinked and subordinated to one political will, the economy and polity are starting to 
separate from one another while the formerly repressed social structure is beginning to 
crystallize and manifest itself. This complex change is difficult to label without crossing 
boundaries of fixed disciplinary claims: economics, sociology and political science.7 
In contrast with the common post-communist vocabulary, there is no imperative 
harmony between political democracy and market economy. As C. Offe pointed out, the 
introduction of democracy and the establishment of a market economy can block each 
other [Offe 1991, 1994]. Similarly, there are no necessary causal links between economic 
hardship and questioning of the parliamentary system. Here, our experience is close to 
Perreira et al., who stressed: “We are aware that the causal chain that leads from individ-
ual discontent to organized reaction and from organized reaction to the abandonment of 
reforms is contingent and complex. Reform may continue against popular resistance, even 
under democratic institutions” [Pereira et al. 1993: 207]. 
Although inquiring into peoples’ minds might be interesting and useful, its fore-
casting value should not be overestimated. People behave not only according to their 
fixed beliefs but also according to their sudden reactions, be they affected by imputed 
motivation or external manipulation. Nor, on the other hand, should we underestimate 
attitudes and perceptions. However, they should be considered not so much according to 
their absolute levels as to their comparative national specificities and status-specific dif-
ferentiations, reciprocal links and attachments robust as well as their short-term and long-
term trends. 
Here, we have proposed two explanatory vehicles for the recent or latent turn to-
wards the left or towards authoritarianism in East-Central European countries: the relative 
deprivation caused by transformation and lasting entitlements to paternalistic care. The 
two rationales are undoubtedly interrelated and can enforce each other. Deprivation calls 
for redistribution and redistribution necessitates a strong state; to work backwards, a large 
redistribution might undermine market forces which could produce deprivation, and so 
on. This makes distinctions between the true “driving forces” of political reactions next to 
impossible. 
In the climate of a considerable level of reliance upon the state and financial hard-
ship through the whole region, we should distinguish firstly between the Czech Republic 
on the one side and the three remaining countries on the other. A small majority of the 
Czech population agrees that the basis for democracy has already been successfully estab-
                                                     
7) Here, we agree with K. Müller’s condensed version: “Without exaggerating too much, we can 
describe an easy division of roles between economic theory, political science and sociology: neo-
classic economists argue by functional requirements of efficient markets; political scientists stress 
the imperatives of Western-style democracy; sociology relates to the institutional prerequisites of 
the functional market. All of this makes sense as far as we declare what Eastern European socie-
ties do not have. In any case, an interesting question is, how rudimentary markets can cooperate 
with unsecured democracy in a time of a loosening social orientation and in an environment of 
delegitimated institutions, and which dynamics are liberated by this” [Müller 1995: 42]. 
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lished, while a small minority thinks that it is right to manifest dissatisfaction by demon-
strations and strikes. The leftist orientation has a prevailingly social democratic character 
which hampers the direct translation of economic dissatisfaction into questioning of the 
democratic system. 
There are, fortunately, only two political parties displaying an above-average 
commitment to demonstrations and strikes and acceptance of a more authoritarian regime 
in the Czech Republic. The first is the extreme rightist Association for the Republic (3% 
of potential voters in mid-1995), and the second is the “refurbished” Communist Party 
(9%). There is also a somewhat higher mass protest inclination among trade union “offi-
cials” which, however, comprise only a very small group. When combining the demon-
stration acceptance and authoritarian preferences, we find less than 5% of the population 
loosely dispersed in the social structure and overconcentrated on the extreme political 
left. 
Compared with the Czech Republic, Slovakia scores twice as high on the authori-
tarian scale, as measured by the “strong hand” preference. Simultaneously, this attitude is 
dispersed among other beliefs without a significant consciousness contour or social status 
profile. The general unspecificity of public opinion, i.e. a lasting confusion of various 
attitudes (contrasting with the gradual crystallization of the Czech opinion landscape) 
also indicates the absence of distinct political actors and/or an unwillingness and/or inca-
pacity to generate any marked change.8 The analysis revealed a discrepancy between the 
disappearing belief that a strong leader will solve economic hardship and the emerging 
association of leftism and authoritarianism. 
The Hungarian population locates itself most on the political left, the leftist atti-
tudes producing a more authoritarian inclination. The propensity to favour a strong leader 
and demonstrations is as strong there as in Slovakia. This might be interpreted as an im-
portant action potential for the political scene. In fact, internal policy is cleaved by the 
fact that the new social-liberal government (established in 1994) is bound to battle for 
severe cuts in the social budget which is the largest in the region.9 The population de-
clared itself somewhat more optimistic in 1994 than in 1993, despite a deterioration of the 
financial situation and the fact that its potential participation in legal demonstrations and 
strikes amounted to 33% [Lengyel 1995]. 
                                                     
8) This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that no manifest disapproval appeared in and after the 
1995 “Red July”, when a packet of four anti-transformation “strategic” laws was passed by the 
Parliament. According to the first law, the general (Czechoslovak) privatization scheme was re-
moved. Instead of distributing state property by vouchers, the populace will be symbolically com-
pensated by state bonds and firms will be in fact leased to “honest entrepreneurs” designated by 
the government. The other three laws are on securities, investment funds (no public exchange of 
capital), and “securing the strategic interests of Slovakia”. A law enabling the state to control 
prices in the “public interest” is to be discussed this autumn. As the Deputy Prime Minister said: 
“Do not fear the word socialism… The world tends towards socialism with a capitalist face or 
towards capitalism with a socialist face”. 
9) This event well documents the pitfall of the market/democracy disharmony mentioned above. In 
fact, the Constitutional Court disapproved budget cuts proposed by the government due to the “un-
readiness of the population” and refused a larger reduction of family allowances and maternity 
benefits. The question rises as to whether the IMF will rank financial discipline and a govern-
ment’s efforts to economize more highly than its respect for democratic rules. 
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The Polish population would most salute a strong leader, representing a sort of sin-
gle value, correlated with a questioning of the legitimacy of wealth and blame-laying for 
poverty on the state, which has no relation, however, to the aggregate of opinions indicat-
ing latent contesting of the system. This is the country with the largest experience of 
large-scale and mass movements, demonstrations and strikes. Surveys confirmed that 
various forms of civic disobedience are considered more likely to be used than in the 
other countries, without being more firmly anchored in the opinion structure. 
In fact, we did not endeavour to hypothesize about any strict relationships between 
the emerging financial hardship, disapproval of economic reforms, support for leftist par-
ties and the salutation of a strong leader. We have tried to model only a part of associa-
tions between economic and political indicators expressing starvation and economic 
insecurity on the one hand and criticism of the system, leftist preferences, and authoritari-
anism on the other. Rather, with simple causal links, we are dealing with a circuit where it 
is difficult to distinguish dependent and independent variables. The relationship is far 
from being an abstract one. In each country, it is rooted in history, modified by the cul-
tural and behavioural setting, and eventually prompted by a particular political situation. 
The level of acceptance of demonstrations and strikes is certainly not negligible 
and separated from the other attitudes. Its inclusion with “standard” political attitudes is 
not, however, very pronounced, and its location within the population’s categories is 
weaker than any other attitude. This leads us to conclude that economic reforms and po-
litical democracy are unlikely to be threatened by a mass movement “from below”.10 
With all the limitations of a standard survey of attitudes, rather less impressive links lead-
ing from perceived economic insecurity to an active questioning of the regime suggest 
there is no immediate threat to new democracies in East-Central Europe. This does not 
diminish, however, the important contribution of such a link to a mass movement once it 
is triggered off and/or fueled by political conflicts. 
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The international file includes: the Czech Republic (1187), Slovakia (817), Hungary (1500) 
and Poland (1491). 
“Economic Expectations and Attitudes.” A biannual survey organized by the socio-economics 
team of the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences headed by the author. The sam-
ples include about 1800-2200 adults in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
SOCO Survey “The Social Consequences of Transition.” A survey conducted in early 1995 on 
about 1000 household random samples of five countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Po-
land, Slovakia and the former Eastern Germany). The Social Consequences of Transition data-
base was created under the aegis of Social Costs of Economic Transformation (SOCO) 
initiated and coordinated by the Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna. 
Operationalization of variables 
“The Dismantling of the Safety Net and its Political Consequences” (Table 4 and 5) 
1. FEELPOOR “Comparing your current standard of living with the others, would you say that 
you are a poor family.” 
2. FEELINSEC “If you look into the near future, are you anxious, do you have a feeling of insecu-
rity?” 
3. UNFAIRPOOR “Most people are responsible for their own poverty.” 
4. UNFAIRWLTH “People get rich here mainly in an unfair way.” 
All answers 1-4: 1. fully agree 2. rather agree 3. rather disagree 4. fully disagree. 
5. LEFTOR “In politics, the terms “left” and “right” are frequently used. When discussing or 
thinking about your own political views, please indicate where you would place yourself on a 
10-grade scale” (extreme left = 10, extreme right = 1). 
6. STATE “Would you agree or disagree that the government should be responsible for the fol-
lowing items: a. Provide a job for everyone who wants one”… 
7. LEADER “A strong leader can do more for a country than legislation, discussions and consulta-
tions can.” 
8. RIOTS “We can expect major eruptions of mass discontent in our society within two years.” 
All answers 7-9: 1.fully agree 2. rather agree 3. rather disagree 4. fully disagree  
 
Czech Republic and Slovakia. “Economic Expectations and Attitudes”, November 1994 (Table 5) 
1. FEELPOOR “Do you thing that you are a poor family?” 
2. FEELINSEC “If you look into the near future, are you anxious, do you have a feeling of insecu-
rity?” 
3. UNFAIRPOOR “Everybody is responsible for their own poverty.” 
4. UNFAIRWLHT “People get rich here mainly in an unfair way.” 
Answers 1, 2 and 4: 4. fully agree 3. rather agree 2. rather disagree 1. fully disagree; answers on 3 
in an opposite sense. 
5. LEFTOR “In politics, the terms “left” and “right” are frequently used. Please indicate where 
you would place yourself regarding your opinions”: 1. clear right 2. rather right 3. middle 4. 
rather left 5. clear left. 
6. STATE “Should the state provide a job to anyone who wants to work?” 
7. LEADER “Would it be better for our country if instead of other ways of solving the current 
situation, a strong hand would govern and somebody say what to do?” 
8. RIOTS “In your opinion, is it right to express dissatisfaction by demonstrations and strikes?” 
All answers 6-8: 4. fully agree 3. rather agree 2. rather disagree 1. fully disagree. 
